Speaker
Description
Social dilemmas are described as “wicked” when they involve additional obstacles to cooperation, such as unclear individual impact, doubts about the link between cooperation and outcomes, and difficulties tracking contributions. We study the effectiveness of norm-nudging interventions in promoting cooperation in such a scenario: waste sorting. Given the difficulties in implementing economic and reputational incentives in this context, we consider moral and social nudges as cost-effective solutions. While moral nudges appeal to doing the right thing encouraging individuals to prioritize moral values, social nudges motivate to act as the virtuous majority of people. We use a 3x2 between-factor design. Participants are exposed to a moral, social, or no nudge, depending on the experimental condition they are randomly assigned to, and on the same basis, they experience a high or low level of cooperation from other players. The task consists of an 8-round computerized waste sorting game in which, in each round, participants must choose how and if to allocate garbage items in separate bins. Choosing to sort is costly and requires dragging objects in the corresponding bins, while non-differentiating is immediate and only requires pressing a button. Number of waste objects sorted is the main dependent variable. We aim to verify the efficacy of each strategy to promote recycling behaviour, and to understand if strategy efficacy is moderated by experienced level of cooperation. Results will help design targeted interventions to encourage sustainable behaviors.
| If you're submitting a poster, would you be interested in giving a blitz talk? | No |
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| If you're submitting a symposium, or a talk that is part of a symposium, is this a junior symposium? | No |
