Speaker
Description
Deciding for others (surrogate decision making) is ubiquitous in
everyday life as many prototypical scenarios can be found in various life domains. Previous research indicated that, when faced with monetary
intertemporal choice for others, people exhibit a more impulsive choice pattern than when deciding for themselves, but still little is known about the underlying cognitive mechanism. Some evidence suggests that a critical role may be covered by the attention devoted to the amount or to the delay information, and to the role of the surrogate person. The current study investigates how intertemporal decisions for the self differ from those made for another person, whose closeness to the participant was manipulated by identifying a friend (less close) or a family member (closer). Participants completed an intertemporal choice task for the self and the other person, while their ocular movements in various areas of interest (AOI) were recorded. Results revealed that participants exhibit a higher discounting rate (more impulsive choices) when deciding for themselves than when deciding for the other person. Also, in the “self condition”, delay information’s AOI received more visive attention than the amount information’s AOI, while the inverse pattern was detected when analyzing attention distribution during the “other condition”. A possible explanation is that, when making decisions for themselves, people may be more likely to generate anticipated negative emotions due to waiting time required for greater rewards, and this negative emotion guides the attentive and decisional processes. Future studies should further explore the mechanism behind the self-other decision gap.
| If you're submitting a symposium talk, what's the symposium title? | EMOZIONE E COGNIZIONE: EVIDENZE DALLA PSICOLOGIA SPERIMENTALE PER UN APPROCCIO INTEGRATO |
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| If you're submitting a symposium, or a talk that is part of a symposium, is this a junior symposium? | No |
